After half a year of shuttle diplomacy, mediation, consultation
and coordination among all the parties concerned, the second round
of six-party talks on the Korean nuclear issue will be held at the
Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on February 25. Jin Linbo, an
international relations expert with the China Institute of
International Studies, under the Chinese Foreign Ministry, offers
an informed opinion.
"This second round of talks will be different to the first round
last August, also held in Beijing. Then the different parties set
out their various positions on the nuclear issue. In the second
round what is needed is for all the parties concerned to show good
faith and reach a written agreement on matters of principle.
However, since Washington and Pyongyang have taken quite different
stances on the nuclear issue and Japan and the Republic of Korea
(ROK) both have their own separate proposals, the new round of
talks will not be easy," said Jin.
Can consensus in principle lead to a joint statement?
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi is China's chief
negotiator at the talks. At a press conference on August 29, 2003
following the first round of six-party talks, he said that the six
parties had reached a six-point consensus on the Korean nuclear
issue. All parties concerned agreed to resolve the nuclear issue
through peaceful means and dialogue and were of the view that
dialogue should continue in order to establish trust, reduce
differences and broaden common ground.
Nevertheless, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK) had reservations about the six-point consensus.
Before leaving Beijing they expressed the view that there was no
need to re-open the talks.
China is hopeful that the consensus reached so far might go on
to be formalized in writing. Jin is cautiously optimistic about
whether a joint statement on this matter will result from the fresh
round of talks.
In addition, Jin said that the six-party talks should be
"institutionalized" to facilitate a final settlement of the nuclear
issue being achieved within a reasonably firm timetable. To achieve
this goal, the parties concerned may set up liaison groups to
maintain contacts in the longer term.
"Institutionalization" would represent a relatively rigorous
form of agreement. Consensus at the conference table would go on to
be set out in the form of a treaty or agreement to be subsequently
ratified by the legislative bodies of each of the individual
nations before taking effect.
Will the EU join in the talks?
"As early as the first round of six-party talks, the DPRK
indicated its wish to have the European Union (EU) involved in the
nuclear negotiations," Jin said. "At the same time the EU in
general and Germany and Switzerland in particular, were stepping up
their efforts in diplomatic mediation, trying to play more
significant roles in ending the Korean nuclear standoff. Swiss
Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey visited Pyongyang and Seoul
from May 16 to 23, 2003. This made clear that nation's position of
wishing to have a say in the nuclear issue."
"The DPRK would like to see the EU at the conference table to
place a constraint on the United States. The EU on its part would
wish to have a greater say in world affairs while taking the
opportunity to promote its economic interests in Asia, "Jin
said.
"In terms of the Iran nuclear crisis, France and Germany helped
to find a mutually satisfactory resolution. By joining in the
Korean nuclear talks, the EU would be able to increase its
influence in Asia while significantly increasing its international
reputation," he added.
According to Jin's analysis, the EU has indicated to the DPRK
that it would not only be interested in joining the talks but in
becoming involved in future economic cooperation in the region.
"If the DPRK were to adopt a reform and opening-up policy
following the Chinese model, then the US and Japan, which are
currently so vigorously involved in the nuclear issue, would surely
be well placed to participate in the country's economic
development. So joining in the talks is a practical way for the EU
to position itself for a slice of this cake," Jin said.
Will the US change its strategy?
Since the nuclear crisis emerged on the Korean Peninsula, the
concessions made by the DPRK are there for all to see, while the US
has adopted a rigid attitude. While occasionally appearing ready to
compromise, the US has however not actually changed its position on
any matters of principle.
Jin is of the view that the US does have room for maneuver on
the Korean nuclear issue but is not anxious for a quick solution.
On the other hand the DPRK can't afford to get bogged down in long
drawn out negotiations and at the same time is endeavouring to
secure economic gains at each step.
Jin points out that the Korean nuclear crisis does not pose a
direct threat to the US as the DPRK's nuclear weapons are well out
of range of US territory.
"Even if the DPRK were to actually launch its missiles, the US
military base in the Pacific Ocean could react promptly. The main
threat that concerns the US is that of nuclear proliferation and
the options it has available to address this are not limited to
peaceful talks. The US could wear the DPRK down by prolonged
economic and military blockades," said Jin adding, "For DPRK, there
is little space for maneuver and it has nothing to gain by putting
up a desperate struggle."
"The DPRK wants to improve its relations with the US and if
possible also with its neighboring countries. However it is
currently facing the problem that the US has branded it as part of
a so-called axis of evil," Jin said.
Jin predicts that the cumulative effect of all these factors
will see the US make technical adjustments to its strategy. For
example, once the DPRK had frozen its nuclear development, the US
could provide DPRK with heavy oil, then conduct nuclear inspections
on DPRK territory and finally establish diplomatic relations. In
this way, the US might respond positively to substantial
concessions by the DPRK. This would be helpful to President George
W. Bush in a presidential election year. However the US cannot be
expected to make any concessions on matters of principle that would
be disadvantageous to Bush's presidential election campaign.
Meanwhile, the DPRK must make some substantial concessions
otherwise it will be difficult for the six-party talks to go much
further.
China, Japan, ROK and Russia each have their
own ideas
China, Japan, ROK and Russia each have their own ideas to bring
to the six-party talks. The position taken by Japan is closest to
that of the US however the Japanese side would also like the talks
to resolve their long-running issue of kidnapped Japanese.
China and Russia don't want to see any escalation of the nuclear
crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Both hope that the Korean nuclear
issue will be resolved peacefully. "If war were ever actually to
break out, it would have a major impact on these two countries,"
said Jin.
In Jin's analysis it is the ROK that is in the most delicately
balanced position. As he points out, "The possession of nuclear
weapons by the DPRK actually exerts little influence on the ROK. As
a matter of fact, assuming that the DPRK did have a nuclear
weapons' capability, the ROK would automatically become a nuclear
power should reunification of north and south Korea be achieved. So
the ROK stresses that the only way of resolving the Korean nuclear
crisis is by peaceful means."
"What most concerns the ROK is to narrow the gap between the
north and south by means of peaceful development and economic aid,
so as to set the scene for a future reunification," said Jin.
(China.org.cn by Li Jingrong and Shao Da, February 23, 2004)