Zhu Weiqun: Sitar has made a good speech and I would like to add a few words. In the past year since the talks we had in November 2008, the 14th Dalai Lama has repeated several ideas over and over again. One is "the Communist Party should retire", and the other is "the Chinese government and the Chinese military planned the March 14 riots in Lhasa in 2008 but accused the Tibetan government-in-exile of doing this". The third idea he loves very much is that the region to the south of "McMahon Line", which we call southern Tibet, is the "territory of India." He also calls himself "a son of India". I have just mentioned a few, and I have bunch of them. Do you think these words can reflect he respects the CPC, and respects the PRC? How can he improve the relationship with central governmentwhen he is saying these words? Therefore, for the 14th Dalai Lama, he has to change his bad behavior characteristic of saying this but doing things differently.

The examples Sitar and I have cited are all taken from the media run by the 14th Dalai Clique and Western media who sympathize with him; none of these come from the Chinese media.

Reporter from Voice of America: I have two questions. In your answer, you said China fully rejected the "Memorandum" that Lodi Gyari refered to. I want to ask in what aspects that the Chinese central governmentcan make a concession, otherwise how would the Dalai Lama have further talks with you? The second one is in your description, there's nothing but criticism, can I ask why you still want to have talks with them?

Zhu Weiqun: The 14th Dalai Lama has never hidden his political proposition. The so-called "Greater Tibet" and "high degree of autonomy" are all known by the public. These issues are all related to China's territory and sovereignty. There's no room for negotiation and we will make no concession in this regard. But why we still hold talks with them? Because we want to give the 14th Dalai Lama a chance to correct his mistakes. Although the 14th Dalai Lama has long been engaging in activities geared to split the motherland, he said he would not seek "Tibetan independence" at the end of the late 1970s when China launched the reform and opening-up program. Given this, the central governmentbegan contact and talks with his people who were also arranged to visit the hinterland and Tibet as well. Although the Dalai clique plotted riots in Lhasa in the late 1980s, which resulted in enormous loss in terms of life and property for the Tibetans, the 14th Dalai Lama later expressed willingness to solve problems under the framework of the Chinese Constitution and within of the PRC. So, we started to resume contact and talks with them again.

Zhu Weiqun: Havn't we shown enough sincerity? Isn't it flexible we have made? Isn't it enough careness we have given to the Dalai Lama? Does it mean we have made good concession only when we let him come back to Tibet and resume feudal serfdom system and carry out "the Greater Tibet" or "high degree of autonomy"? We have carefully explained and talked to them on the "Memorandum for All Tibetans to Enjoy Genuine Autonomy" and then the "Explanation to the Memorandum". In the talks in November 2008, I told Lodi Gyari, "We will not discuss with you the ‘Tibet Issue', but we may examine your 'Memorandum‘ so that we can find out whether you will give up 'Tibet independence‘ and go back to the patriotic position". And we did fully analyze this "Memorandum" in seven aspects and warned them against the fact that the "Memorandum" is completely against the central governmentand the PRC Constitution. When we said so we were showing them our sincerity and patience, as we could simply ignore the "Memorandum" at all. This time, however, Lodi Gyari again refered to the "Memorandum" to the Central Government, so we could do nothing but criticize them again. If the 14th Dalai Lama doesn't want to be criticized, simply give up all that "Tibet independence", "half Independence" or "convert independence". Until then, the central governmentis satisfied and we will praise him, that's for sure.